

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 GENEVA 7030

EXDIS USSALTTWO

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENTS OF AUG 16, 1977
(SALT TWO 1349)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUG 16, 1977:

SEMENOV'S FIRST STATEMENT, AUG 16, 1977

FIRST OF ALL, I WANT TO WELCOME THE WELL-KNOWN MEMBERS
OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, SENATOR GARY HART AND CONGRESSMAN
ROBERT CARR, WHO ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING TODAY.
HERE WE HAVE ALREADY MET WITH SENATORS CLAIBORNE PELL, CHARLES
MATHIAS, JOHN GLENN AND GEORGE MCGOVERN. THE USSR DELEGATION
BELIEVES THAT THESE MEETINGS WILL BE USEFUL IN TERMS OF ENSURING
PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON
THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

SEMENOV'S SEOND STATEMENT, AUG 16, 1977

AMONG THE ADDITIONAL ISSUES REFERRED TO THE DELEGATIONS
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FOR DISCUSSION IS THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING IN THE PROTOCOL
BEING WORKED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT A PRO-
VISION REGARDING ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS OF TEST LAUNCHES OF
MISSILES.

AS YOU KNOW, IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING WORLD
PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, AND AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIAT-

TIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, THE USSR AND THE U.S. SIGNED THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, IN WASHINGTON IN 1973. AN IMPORTANT STEP WAS TAKEN THEREBY TOWARD REDUCING AND ULTIMATELY ELIMINATING THE DANGER OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND TOWARD ESTABLISHING A SYSTEM OF REAL GUARANTEES OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS-- THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, CONCLUDED IN MAY 1972, AS WELL AS THE PROTOCOL TO THE ABM TREATY, SIGNED IN JULY 1974--ALSO OCCUPY AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE REALIZATION OF THESE OBJECTIVES.

THE SIDES REACHED AGREEMENT ON A WHOLE SERIES OF SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AIMED AT REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR IN THE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE USSR-USA DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK AND THE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., WHICH WERE SIGNED SEPT 30, 1971; IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 4 OF THE LATTER EACH SIDE SHALL NOTIFY THE OTHER SIDE IN ADVANCE OF ANY PLANNED MISSILE LAUNCHES, IF SUCH LAUNCHES WILL EXTEND BEYOND ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY IN THE DIRECTION OF THE OTHER SIDE.

ALL THE AFOREMENTIONED SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS DO NOT ONLY REQUIRE STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ESTABLISHED
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BY THESE DOCUMENTS, BUT THE SIDES ARE ALSO CALLED UPON TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, IN AN EFFORT TO ELIMINATE THAT THREAT COMPLETELY.

UNDOUBTEDLY, THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, CURRENTLY BEING NEGOTIATED, WILL ALSO BE A MOST IMPORTANT STEP IN THIS DIRECTION, IN IMPROVING TRUST BETWEEN OUR STATES AND STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE.

THESE ARE PRECISELY THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LIE AT THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND AT THE BASIS OF THOSE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH GUIDE THE USSR DELEGATION.

STRIVING FOR PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT A

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DIFFERENT LEVEL, THE USSR DELEGAION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION TO STATE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING A PROVISION ON ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MISSILE TEST LAUNCHES IN A PROTOCOL WHICH WOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT, WOULD COME INTO EFFECT AT THE SAME TIME AS THE AGREEMENT AND WOULD HAVE A TERM OF THREE YEARS. A PROVISION OF A GENERAL NATURE ON THIS MATTER COULD BE DRAWN UP IN THE PROTOCOL.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT IN INDIFICUAL CASES PRIOR NOTIFICATIONS COULD BE PROVIDED BY THE SIDE CARRYING OUT MISSILE LAUNCHES WITHIN ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY, WHEN, IIN ITS OPININON, SUCH LAUNCHES COULD BE MISINTERPRETED AND GIVE RISE TO CONCERN ON THE OTHER SIDE.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THIS IS WHAT THE U.S. SIDE WAS INTERESTED IN, AND THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TABLED IS AIMED AT MEETING THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE UNITED STATES IN THIS CONNECTION.

AS FOR THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OF THE FORM, TIMING AND SCOPE OF NOTIFICATION, ETC., THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT,
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AS AGREED IN THE COURSE OF THE PREVIOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, THESE QUESTIONS BE DEALT WITH BY THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

REACHING AGREEMENT ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS ON A PROVISIONS CONCERNING ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING TRUST BETWEEN OUR STATES AND WOULD MEET THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION IS ENGAGED IN PRODUCTIVE WORK, INCLUDING WORK ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES AIMED AT PREVENTING A NUCLEAR CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR, AS YOU KNOW, AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED IN THE COMMISSION ON THE PROCEDURE FOR PROVIDING NOTIFICATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE UNSUCCESSFUL MISSILE LAUNCHES.

THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE OTHER AFOREMENTIONED PRECEPTS WHICH ARE IN EFFECT, THE PROPOSAL TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE CONSTITUTES A GOOD BASIS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON AN APPROPRIATE PROVISION IN THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE NEW AGREEMENT.

SEMENOV'S THIRD STATEMENT, AUG 16, 1977

AS ALREADY REPEATEDLY NOTED IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDS VERIFICATION AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH IS UNDER PREPARATION.

AND THIS IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE, BECAUSE ENSURING CONFIDENCE THAT THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ARE STRICTLY SECRET

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AND CONSISTENTLY COMPLIED WITH IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR THE STABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT; AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, BOTH SIDES ARE EQUALLY--AND I STRESS, EQUALLY--INTERESTED IN THIS.

THE NEED, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, TO ENSURE THE VERIFIABILITY, BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ENSUES FROM THE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS IN THIS FIELD, WHICH ARE IN EFFECT, AS WELL AS FROM A WHOLE SERIES OF RELEVANT UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S.

THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, CONCLUDED AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN THE SUMMER OF 1973, SPECIFICALLY REAFFIRMS

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EXDIS/USSALTTWO

THAT "LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE SUBJECT
TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS."

IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT AS RESULT OF WHAT CAN NOW
BE REFERRED TO AS MANY YEARS OF PAINSTAKING WORK BY THE DELEGA-
TIONS, THE SIDES HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF THE JOINT DRAFT ON A SYSTEM OF OBLIGATIONS, WHICH NOT ONLY
CONSTITUTES A FURTHER MAJOR STEP IN THE LIMITATION OF STRA-
TEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, BUT ALSO PROVIDES THE SIDES WITH CON-
FIDENCE THAT THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED WILL BE STRICTLY
COMPLIED WITH.

THUS, THE DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS BEING LIMITED ARE
CONCENTRATED IN ARTICLE II, WHICH HAS LARGELY BEEN AGREED
UPON. THUS, THE CONTRACTING PARTIES WILL HAVE A JURIDICALLY
PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS UNDERSTANDING OF PRECISELY WHICH ARMS
ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING WORKED OUT.

ARTICLES III AND V ESTABLISH THE AGGREGATE NUMERICAL
LEVELS TO WHICH THE CORRESPONDING ARMS OF THE SIDES WILL BE
LIMITED.

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ARTICLE IV, MUCH OF WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED UPON, COTAINS
A WHOLE SERIES OF IMPORTANT AND SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON STRA-

TEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING THE OBLIGATIONS NOT TO START CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS, NOT TO RELOCATE SUCH LAUNCHERS AND NOT TO INCREASE THE ORIGINAL VOLUME OF ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS, AND SO FORTH.

ARTICLE VI, THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF WHOSE PROVISIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN AGREED, DEALS WITH ACTUAL STATES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH ARE COVERED BY THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED, AS WELL AS WITH THE MANNER FOR INCLUDING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN THE AGGREGATE LEVELS BEING ESTABLISHED OR--UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES--EXCLUDING THEM FROM THESE LEVELS.

I WOULD ESPECIALLY LIKE TO NOTE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OBLIGATIONS THE SIDES WOULD ASSUME UNDER ARTICLES XII AND XIII OF THE DRAFT--ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES. COMPLIANCE WITH THESE OBLIGATIONS PLAYS AN EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN TERMS OF ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

A MAJOR ROLE IN ENSURING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE SIDES THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT ARE BEING COMPLIED WITH WILL ALSO BE PLAYED BY THE SCC, WHOSE FUNCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN AGREED UPON IN ARTICLE XVII.

THUS, THE TOTALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, TAKEN IN THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP AND THEIR INTERNAL UNITY, ENSURES CONFIDENCE OF THE SIDES THAT THE LIMITATIONS AGREED UPON IN VLADIVOSTOK AND DURING SUBSEQUENT SOVIET-SECRET

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AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE COMPLIED WITH UNDER CONDITIONS OF APPROPRIATE AND RELIABLE VERIFICATION OF SUCH COMPLIANCE.

AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE SYSTEM OF OBLIGATIONS, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO ENSURE CONFIDENCE THAT THE OBLIGATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ARE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH, IS HELD BY ARTICLE XVI OF THE DRAFT.

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES HAVE AGREED ON THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE XVI, PAR. 1, UNDER WHICH, FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, EACH SIDE SHALL USE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AT ITS DISPOSAL IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

IN DRAFTING THIS PROVISION THE SIDES WERE GUIDED BY THE

EXPERIENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION

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EXDIS/USSALTTWO

EXPERIENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMSN, WHICH ARE IN FORCE AND WHICH
HAVE CLEARLY SHOWN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL
MEANS OF VERIFICATION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR MONITORING ESTAB-
LISHED LIMITATIONS.

THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL
MEANS HAS THEREBY BEEN CONFIRMED AS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES AT THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

AGREEMENT HAS ALSO BEEN REACHED ON PAR. 2 OF THIS ARTICLE,
UNDER WHICH EACH SIDE UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER SIDE
OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. 1 OF THIS ARTICLE; THIS IS
TO BECOME ONE OF THE GUARANTEES OF NORMAL CONDITIONS FOR THE
OPERATION OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION IN
CARRYING OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW
AGREEMENT.

AGREEMENT ON THESE PROVISIONS EMBODIES THE DECISIONS
RECORDED IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE BASIC PARAMETERS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND
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SPECIFIES THAT IT "WILL INCORPORATE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972, WHICH WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL OCTOBER 1977."

IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE US DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE AUGUST 1, 1975 MEETING THAT AGREED PARAS. 1 AND 2 OF ARTICLE XVI ARE RECOGNIZED AS "ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT." AT THE AUGUST 5, 1975 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION SPOKE OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THESE PROVISIONS, AMONG OTHERS, OF THE DRAFT BEING WORKED OUT.

APPROVAL BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT AS OF NOVEMBER 20, 1976, AND THUS OF AGREED PARAS. 1 AND 2 OF ARTICLE XVI, AS WELL, WAS EXPRESSED, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS, BY THE SOVIET AND U.S. SIDES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN USSR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS A.A. GROMYKO AND U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE IN GENEVA IN MAY 1977.

THERE IS ALSO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES ON ARTICLE XVI, PAR. 3--THE BAN ON DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES. THERE IS A GOOD BASIS FOR REACHING FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF PAR. 3 OF THIS ARTICLE IN ITS ENTIRETY, ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ACCEPTABILITY.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS STUDIED THIS QUESTION.

IN THE INTERESTS OF PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE BY THE U.S. SIDE, THE USSR DELEGATION, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION, PROPOSES THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON ARTICLE XVI, PAR. 3, IN THE FOLLOWING WORDING:

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"PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI

EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. THIS OBLIGATION SHALL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CURRENT CONSTRUCTIONS, ASSEMBLY, CONVERSION, OR OVERHAUL PRACTICES."

WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THIS NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL WILL BE REPORTED AND STUDIED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT. WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE U.S. SIDE'S CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS SCORE.

IN THIS CONNECTION, WITH REGARD TO THE AGREED STATEMENT
TO ARTICLE XVI, PAR. 3, CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION, WORK
THEREON WILL CONTINUE. THE U.S. SIDE IS AWARE OF THE SOIVET
PROPOSALS ON THIS SCORE.

PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XVI

EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT
MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. THIS
OBLIGATION SHALL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CURRENT CONSTRUCTION,
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